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I
PROPAGANDA OF THE PEMOD OF WAR COMMUNISM
With the laicization of the state in the nineteenth century, its affairs were divorced
from ideology, and political controversy was transferred to the realm of social action.
The new state was designed to serve everybody and therefore had to be apolitical.
Nineteenth-century liberalism produced the idea of the state dedicated to the rule
of law (Rechtsstaat), a perfect and continuing form of government able to accommo-
date the changing social content and a perfect instrument of changing social policies.
The October 1917 revolution in Russia opened a new era which discarded
basic ideas underlying the public order represented by the state of the liberal age.
The state became a part of the social structure; the single political party controlling
the state was identified with the exercise of power and its party program with state
policy. This change was the direct effect of conditions of political life in imperial
Russia, in which revolutionary parties were proscribed and labor movements and the
struggle for social change had no place in public life. Political struggle was carried
underground, and police repressions were answered by propaganda, which was sub-
versive and respected no rules.
The situation changed but little after October 1917. The new regime was faced
with chaos, armed resistance, and foreign aggression. Revolutionary authorities
who took over functions of government were paying no heed to the commands and
decrees of the central government, while the political opposition and suppressed na-
tionalities were organizing countercoups or preparing to establish their national states.
The most imminent danger to the existence of the new revolutionary regime came
from the West, where the continued advance of the armies of the Central Powers
was threatening the very base of the Bolshevik power.
In this situation propaganda was the only weapon the new regime had and the
only technique of social and governmental action with which it was familiar. In-
deed, the Bolsheviks' attainment to power and their position as the ruling party in
Russia were from the beginning exploited as another channel for propaganda action.
*This article has been adapted from a chapter in a forthcoming book, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw IN
SOVIET THEoRYAN PRACTICE, to be published in 1967.
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LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
The first acts of government, and in particular the new decrees, were acts of propa-
ganda only thinly disguised as legislative activity. Soviet decrees of the early period
had little chance of being enforced, and even in the eyes of their authors were not
designed to have serious binding effect. They were, according to the recollections of
Trotsky, "the program of the Party uttered in the language of power" and, as such,
"means of propaganda rather than acts of administration."1 Lenin, writing in the
first days of the new regime, justified the feverish legislative activity of his government
as follows:
It does not matter that many points in our decrees shall never be carried out;
their task is to teach the masses how to take practical steps .... We shall not look
at them as absolute rules to be given effect under all circumstances.2
Examples of this type of legislation are too numerous to be listed exhaustively
here. The very first act of the new revolutionary government was the Decree on
Peace of October 28 (November 8), 1917, which invited "all belligerent nations and
their governments to begin immediate negotiations for a just and democratic peace. ' 3
This decree was followed by the decree containing the declaration of rights of the
nations of Russia;4 later came a note of November 8, 1917, addressed to the diplo-
matic representatives of the Allied Powers in Russia concerning armistice and
immediate peace negotiations;5 then came the announcement of the People's Com-
missar for Foreign Affairs concerning publication of secret treaties,6 an appeal of
the Soviet government to the Moslem Toilers of Russia and the East,7 and so forth,
to name only a few.
All these legislative, diplomatic, and administrative acts bore the stamp of the
conviction that the tide of the revolution was about to engulf practically all the
countries involved in the war. In Lenin's words, the war had reached the moment
when it was transformed from an imperialistic into a revolutionary warP Looking at
the general situation from the Russian vantage point, Soviet leaders thought that the
program of the world revolution could be implemented without delay. They saw the
ITRorrsKv, MOIA ZmzN [My LiFz] 65 (1930). [Translations of all foreign-language material quoted
herein are by the author unless otherwise indicated.]
16 LENIN, SOCmNENIA [WORKS] 149 (1924).
' Sobranie uzakonenii i rasporiazheni raboche-krestianskogo pravitelstva [Collection of Laws and
Decrees], no. i (U.S.S.R. 1917) [hereinafter cited as Sobranie uzak. i rasp.].
'Izvestia, Nov. 3, 1917-
5 d., Nov. 10, X917.
0 ibid.
' Sobranie uzak. i rasp. no. 6 (1917).
'As Lenin explained,
"We Marxists do not belong to the absolute opponents of any kind of war . . . . Our aim is to
bring about a socialist community, which, by abolishing the division of mankind into classes and
by bringing to an end any exploitation of man by man and of one nation by another, will un-
avoidably preclude any possibility of wars in general. But in the war for achieving such socialist
community we are bound to find conditions in which the class struggle within a single nation may
come into collision with a war between different nations . . . . Therefore, we cannot deny the
possibility of revolutionary wars ...which ... have a direct bearing upon revolutions ... .
3o LENsH, op. cit. supra note 2, at 332-33.
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beginning of the mighty revolutionary wave in German and Austrian labor unrest,
war exhaustion in the West, and troop mutinies in the Allied armies. Consequently,
they paid little attention to the inability of the Russian armies to resist effectively
German and Austrian advances on the Russian front. In order to win the revolution
in Russia and to carry it west, Bolshevik leaders did not hesitate to subvert the dis-
cipline in Russian armies hard pressed by the enemyP They believed that the
weakness of Russian arms would be more than counterbalanced by the disruptive
effects of communist propaganda and troop fraternization at the front, which would
destroy the discipline and the will to fight of the enemy armies. This understanding
of the world situation conditioned the technique and tenor of the Soviet propaganda
in those early days of the regime's existence.
Bolsheviks made no distinction among the Allies, enemies, and neutral powers.
In its diplomatic and propaganda activity, the Bolshevik government addressed itself
to the masses, which in its opinion were seething with revolution and which it pro-
posed to mobilize for the great struggle for the new order. For instance, on No-
vember 28, 1917, the Council of the People's Commissars of the RSFSR addressed an
appeal to the peoples of the belligerent nations asking them to join the Soviet govern-
ment in negotiations for an immediate armistice. A similar technique was followed
in the Appeal to the Moslem Toilers of Russia and the East of December 7, 1917,10
the Appeal to the Toilers of the Oppressed Peoples of Europe of December 9,
1917,1" and the Appeal to the Peoples and Governments of the Allied Countries of
December 17, 19171 As time went on, Soviet appeals to the "toilers and workers" of
the world, or of particular countries, were replaced by appeals to the specific workers'
organizations. For example, on May 4, 1918, the Soviet government appealed to the
trade unions of the world to support the Soviet republic in its struggle for peace.'"
The technique of direct appeals to the masses of other countries was not affected
by the actual status of Soviet contacts with the governments of the countries con-
cerned. Brest-Litovsk peace negotiations with the Central Powers proceeded to the
tune of a massive propaganda campaign exhorting their populations to support the
policy of the revolutionary regime. 4 The signing of the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty
had no effect upon the flow of the Soviet propaganda addressed against the Central
Powers in spite of the provisions it contained on the subject' 5
Once the Central Powers were forced to acknowledge their defeat by the Western
Powers, the Soviet Union intensified its propaganda activity, combining its notes
9 Appeal of the Council of People's Commissars to the Army and Navy of November 9 (22), 1917, I
MINIS TESYVO INNOSTRANNYKH DEL, DOKUMENTY VNESHNEI POLITIKI SSSR [MINISTHY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
DOCUMENTS OF FOREIGN POLICY OF THE USSR] 19 (957) [hereinafter cited as DoKumENrY VNESHNEI
PoLrrIKI].
"o Sobranie uzak. i rasp. no. 6 (1917).
11lzvestia, Dec. 9, 1917 •
"I' d., Dec. 17, 1917.
"SDoKUMENTY PROLETARSEOI SOLIDAENOSTI [DOcUMENTS OF PROLETARIAN SOLIDARITY] 15 (I962).
14 See text accompanying notes 20 and 22-23 infra.15Ibid.
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addressed to the republican government of Germany with appeals to the revolutionary
organizations which came into being in Germany in the turbulent days of November
1918. Soviet diplomatic correspondence with the new German government con-
cerning withdrawal of German troops from the occupied territories, renewal of diplo-
matic relations, removal of property from the occupied territories, and so forth,
was communicated to the German soviets of soldiers and workers. While on one
hand the Soviet government sought support for its demands in its political action,
on the other it was contributing to the political education of the revolutionary leaders
in Germany. It was convinced that the republican regime in Germany was a
transitory stage, and that, eventualy, it would be, as it was in Russia, replaced by a
workers and peasant government, leading to the revolution which was to be a copy
of the Russian Revolution. 6
Eventually, however, the new Russian regime was forced to realize that its hopes
that German armies in the occupied territories would succumb to the revolution
would not be fulfilled, and that the presence of German armies in the western Russian
territories and their withdrawal home were no longer controlled by the German
government, either in its official form or in its revolutionary incarnation. It became
apparent that German armies in Russia would observe that condition of the Armistice
Agreement of November i, 1918, that the Western Allies were to control the
withdrawal of German troops from Russia, thus providing a measure of protection to
the incipient national regimes in eastern Europe. This fact turned again the full
blast of Soviet propaganda to the revolutionary forces in the West.' 7
In time, when the Soviet Union had regained its place in the community of na-
tions, Soviet official propaganda addressed to the masses in support of its policy had
to be replaced by other techniques. The direct appeal method was reserved for the
moments of crisis and intense political struggle. It was revived in the time of the
Second World War and later during the period of so-called "Cold War." It was also
used in situations in which Soviet leaders could address themselves to a foreign nation
from the position of a major allied power which acquired special responsibilities due
to the political settlement following the Second World War. A further example of
this technique is to be found in a series of Khrushchev's speeches connected with
so-called atomic diplomacy.' Another unusual example of direct address by a
Soviet leader to a foreign nation was Stalin's New Year's message to the Japanese in
I952'P
16I DoKummN'rY v5NEIsim POLITIKI 598, 6ox, 6o2, 605, 609, 6ii (957). Cf. Chicherin's Note of
Nov. 14, x1z8, id. at 567.
iT1 id. at 135, 208, 268 (1958).
" "The Soviet Union," Khrushchev said, "supports the idea of setting up a rocket and atom free zone
in the Scandinavian peninsula and the Baltic area . . . . It would be beneficial to the Peoples of all
Scandinavian countries if Scandinavia were to become an atom free zone in which there would be no
military bases of other countries . . .. I hope I shall be understood properly in Norway and Denmark
if I say that these countries have landed in the Atlantic Bloc through a misunderstanding .... " Pravda,
June x6, x959.
"
9 Id., Mfay 31, 1952.
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The rationale behind this direct approach was that the Soviet government was only
formally a government of one country; it was also a leader of the world working
class. Its policy has a broader significance, however. During the Brest-Litovsk
negotiations, Izvestia (the official organ of the Soviet government) wrote:
Allied nations ought to be aware of the fact that negotiations were begun and
shall continue irrespective of the course of the Allied diplomacy. In these negotia-
tions where the Russian delegation represents the interests of the entire democratic
world, the fate of all nations is involved, including those whose diplomats refuse to
participate in them 20
After the Second World War the Soviet Union became the representative of the
interests of the socialist system, which now includes a number of countries with
communist governments. As Khrushchev explained in connection with the Soviet
use of the veto power in the United Nations Security Council, creation of the Soviet
right of veto gave to the socialist states the same rights as the capitalist states to in-
fluence the course of public affairs in the world.2 '
II
RESTRICTIONS ON PROPAGANDA AFTER THE FrST WORLD WAR
While in the immediate period following the October Revolution (x917) the new
regime enjoyed in its isolation a complete freedom of propaganda, the process of
returning to normalcy, which became a necessity if the regime were to survive,
placed serious limitations on the propaganda activities of the Russian government.
Provisions of practically all treaties which provided for the settlement of political
questions between revolutionary Russia and other members of the international com-
munity contained a clause by which the contracting parties exchanged promises to
refrain from hostile and subversive propaganda. German conditions of peace dictated
to the Russian delegation at the Brest-Litovsk Conference on February 21, 1918, pro-
vided that "Russia shall discontinue all official or officially supported agitation and
propaganda directed against the governments or governmental or military institutions
of the Central Powers., 22 Article 2 of the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty of March 3,
1918, stated accordingly:
The Contracting Parties shall refrain from all agitation or propaganda directed
against the governments or governmental institutions of the other party. Insofar as
this obligation is binding on Russia, it applies to those territories which are occupied
by the Four Power Alliance. 23
While these provisions were honored in breach rather than in observance,
sanguine hopes for the world revolution began to wane as time went on, and the
20 Izvestia, Nov. 23, I917. (Emphasis added.)
21 KI-HRUSHCHEV, ZA MIR, ZA RAZORUZHENIE, ZA SVOBODU NARODOV [FOR PAcF, DISARMAMENT, AND
FREEDOM OF PEOPLES] 288 (I960).
2' 1 DoxumENTY VNESHNEI POLITIKI 113.23 Id. at ix9.
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Bolshevik government was forced to realize that formal peace with other nations
would require that at least the more drastic forms of subversion by propaganda would
have to be discontinued. The Armistice Agreement of January 30, 1920, with Latvia,
which was one of the first treaties with Russia's western limitrophes, provided
(article 22) that Russia would desist from "all propaganda and its support in the
territory of Latvia, directed against its government or political or social order."24
Some time later, Soviet efforts to establish relations with Britain caused Lord
Curzon to formulate in a memorandum delivered to the Russian government a
number of conditions for the recognition of the Soviet regime. These conditions,
eagerly accepted by Chicherin, the Foreign Commissar of the Moscow government
(Note of July 7, 1920), stated that both parties would refrain from hostile activities,
from conducting official propaganda, and from all measures directed against the other
party, whether direct or indirect, and against the institutions of the other party. In
particular, the Soviet government was to refrain from all efforts, by means of military
action or propaganda, to incite the nations of Asia to hostile activity directed against
British interests or the British Empire 5
Peace treaties with the three Baltic Republics concluded in i92o provided that the
contracting parties would not support on their territories activities of organizations
or groups pretending to the role of government of the other party, or aiming at the
overthrow of the government of the other party 6 The Polish-Soviet Preliminary
Peace Treaty (art. 2) of October 12, i92o, provided that "both contracting parties
mutually affirm full respect for their governmental sovereignty and the obligation
not to interfere in the internal affairs of the other party. '2 7 The final Peace Treaty of
March i8, 192i (art. V), provided that each of the "contracting parties guarantees
full respect for the governmental sovereignty of the other party, and shall refrain from
all kinds of intervention in its internal affairs and in particular from agitation, propa-
ganda and all forms of intervention or support for such intervention." '
Almost simultaneously with the Polish peace treaty the Soviet government entered
into a commercial agreement with Great Britain for the reopening of British-Russian
trade, which constituted a de facto recognition of the government in Russia.
The agreement was clearly meant to be a first step in the normalization of interna-
tional relations between the two powers. Article A of the agreement obligated both
contracting parties to refrain from hostile actions or measures directed against the
other party, as well as from conducting within its territory official propaganda,
whether directly or indirectly aimed at the institutions of the British Empire or of
the Russian Socialist Republic.
3 1 H id. at 337.
MIII id. at 17-18 (1959).
leTreaty of Peace with Estonia, Feb. 2, 1920, II DOIMENTY VNESHNEI POLITIKI 339; Treaty of
Peace with Lithuania, July 12, 192o, III id. at 28; Treaty of Peace with Latvia, Aug. ix, 192o, III id. at
S;II DoxumENTY VNEsHNEi POLnIKI 248.
a aId. at 623.
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Russia in particular agreed not to undermine the British position in India and
Afghanistan, and generally not to harm British interests in Asia, while in exchange
Great Britain agreed to adopt the same policy in the indigenous states which were
formerly a part of the Russian Empire. Furthermore, the prohibition of propaganda
included also action outside the territory of each contracting party, including all
manner of assistance and the support for propaganda activities by others. Finally,
both parties agreed to issue proper instructions to their agents.29
The British-Soviet agreement served as a model for a similar preliminary com-
mercial agreement with Italy, signed on December 26, 192i, which repeated -almost
verbatim the terminology of the agreement with Britain. 0
The abortive Soviet-British General Agreement of August 8, 1924, provided in
article 16 that:
The contracting parties solemnly declare their desire and aim to live with each
other in peace and friendship, to respect strictly the indisputable right of the
other State to order its life according to its will within the limits of its jurisdiction,
to refrain and to prevent all persons and organizations, under its direct or indirect
control, including organizations in receipt of financial assistance, from doing acts
open or covert, which may in any manner create danger for the peace and welfare
of any part of the territory of the Soviet Union or of the British Empire, or impair
relations of the Soviet Union or those of the British Empire with their neighbors
or any other countries.3 1
Similarly, the exchange of notes between the Soviet and French governments of
October 28, 1924, which initiated normal diplomatic relations between the two
countries contained the following passage in the Soviet answer to the French initative:
As the French Government, the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet
Union also considers that mutual noninterference in the affairs of the two parties
constitutes an indispensable condition of relations with other countries in general,
and in particular in relations with France, and acknowledges a similar declaration
of the French Government in this matter.3 2
One of the most complete statements of the mutual duties of noninterference in
each other's internal affairs by the Soviet Union and capitalist governments was the
exchange of notes between Maxim Litvinoff and President Roosevelt of November i6,
1933, preliminary to re-establishing diplomatic relations between the United States
and Russia. The Soviet note (identical in substance to the American reply) ran as
follows:
I have the honor to inform you that coincident with the establishment of diplo-
matic relations between our two governments it will be the fixed policy of the
Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:
9Id. at 6o8.
IV id. at 596 (196o).
31VH id. at 623 (x963).
551d. at 516.
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I. To respect scrupulously the indisputable right of the United States to order
its own life within its own jurisdiction in its own way and to refrain from inter-
fering in any manner in the internal affairs of the United States, its territories or
possessions.
2. To refrain, and to restrain all persons in government service and all organiza-
tions of the government or under its direct or indirect control, including organiza-
tions in receipt of any financial assistance from it, from any act overt or covert liable
in any way whatsoever to injure the tranquillity, prosperity, order, or security of the
whole or any part of the United States, its territories or possessions, and, in particular,
from any act tending to incite or encourage armed intervention, or any agitation or
propaganda having as an aim, the violation of territorial integrity of the United
States, its territories or possessions, or the bringing about by force of a change in the
political or social order of the whole or any part of the United States, its territories or
possessions.
3. Not to permit the formation or residence on its territory of any organization
or group-and to prevent the activity on its territory of any organization or group,
or of representatives or officials of any organization or group-which makes claim
to be the government of, or makes attempt upon the territorial integrity of, the
United States, its territories or possessions; not to form, subsidize, support or
permit on its territory military organizations or groups having the aim of armed
struggle against the United States, its territories or possessions, and to prevent any
recruiting on behalf of such organizations and groups.
4. Not to permit the formation or residence on its territory of any organization
or group-and to prevent the activity on its territory of any organization or group,
or of representatives or officials of any organization or group-which has as an aim
the overthrow or the preparation for the overthrow of, or the bringing about by
force of a change in, the political or social order of the whole or any part of the
United States, its territories or possessionsP
III
T~m COMMUNIST INTEI ATIONAL AND Sov=n DIPLOMACY
It was obvious from the beginning that the Soviet government would be dis-
inclined to respect treaty provisions prohibiting hostile propaganda against the
regimes of the capitalist countries. Only a few months after the Brest-Litovsk Peace
Treaty, the Soviet and German governments were engaged in a lively exchange of
charges and countercharges regarding the hostile propaganda which was filling the
pages of Russian and German papers. The Russian position was that it was un-
reasonable to expect the Soviet government to refrain from criticism of the social and
economic institutions of the capitalist states or from commenting adversely on their
policies. In his reply to the letter of the German consul general in Russia, the
People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs admitted quite candidly that:
The Soviet government . . . is an organ of revolutionary struggle. It applies
drastic measures against its enemies in the civil war, but at the same time it relies
upon the revolutionary conscience of the masses, which it represents, rather than on
their passive submission, and in the political camp which it heads it enjoys the
$a 28 AM. . INTL' L. SupP. 3-4 (1934).
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authority of the leader of the comrades consciously following the same revolutionary
path.... The Workers' Peasant Government desires that good-neighborly rela-
tions and peaceful coexistence (mirnoe sozhytelstvo) with Germany be fully estab-
lished, paying no regard to differences in the order of the two countries, and it is
convinced that the German government is equally desirous of peaceful coexistence;
at the same time, while pursuing the policy of peaceful coexistence, it [the Soviet
government] remains true to its nature, just as the German government, and expects
that it [the German government], as.the Soviet government, shall reckon with the
consequences of these differences, which have not been an obstacle in the develop-
ment of good-neighborly relations, just recently established, and correspond to the
deeply rooted interests of both parties. 4
This is probably the first, and the most candid, formulation of that complex of
principles which were to govern Soviet relations with the capitalist world,
which more recendy has been restated in the form of the doctrine of "peaceful co-
existence." Peace on the frontiers, correct diplomatic relations, economic and other
forms of international cooperation must not be affected by the fact that at the
same time the Soviet Union was engaged in an ideological struggle with the very
foundations of the capitalist order of things. Thus the Soviet government claimed
the right not to conform to the traditional concept of correct international relations
between states and governments at peace. The very purpose of the Soviet govern-
ment was to promote revolution, and it was an instrument of that revolution and
of the revolutionary movement. At the time when Chicherin wrote his note in the
name of the Soviet government, the Soviet leadership was convinced that the great
transformation of the human society, begun by the Russian revolution, was to be
expected but shortly. It was unrealistic then to expect that the Soviet government
would desist from the policy which was its very raison d'tre.
The attitude of the Soviet government could hardly have been countenanced
by the German government. On November 4, 1918, Russian couriers were detained,
the diplomatic pouch was opened and searched, and the following day, in answer to
the Russian protest, the diplomatic mission of the Soviet government was ordered to
leave-an event of singular importance in view of the impending German defeat and
surrender in the West. At the moment of the long awaited revolutionary upheaval
in Germany, Soviet diplomats were absent from Berlin 5
As the days of October receded into history, the regime in Russia, in its quest
for respectability and peaceful relations with the members of the international com-
munity, was forced to abandon its intransigent position voiced in the note to the
German government in November 1918. The Soviet government adopted the posi-
tion that as a member of the international community it must refrain from hostile
propaganda and intervention into the internal affairs of other countries. It recog-
s, I DoxmiENTY VNE SnEi POLrTIK 488.
' There seems to be little doubt as to the fact that the Soviet mission in Berlin was engaged in
espionage and subversive propaganda. As to the events of November 4-5, see I id. at 56o f.; TIMoTHY
A. TARxcouzso, WA AND PEAcE IN SoviET DIPLOmAcY 75-76 (1940).
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nized this duty even with regard to states with which the Soviet Union had no diplo-
matic relations and no treaty obligations dealing with propaganda activities. This
seems to be apparent from the Soviet Foreign Commissar's declaration of Septem-
ber 26, 1924, made in connection with the question of American apprehensions as
regards establishing formal diplomatic relations with Russia. The Soviet govern-
ment, in the American opinion, was directly involved in the activities of the Komin-
tern, and as such could not be trusted to adhere to the rules governing the conduct
of formal diplomatic relations. Chicherin's answer disclaimed all responsibility for
the activities of the Komintern. He drew a parallel between the Communists in
governmental positions in Russia and Republicans in the American administra-
tion.36 In order to conform to accepted standards, propaganda activity aimed at the
promotion of the world revolution was dissociated from the official government
of the Soviet Union. The ideal instrument for that purpose proved to be the Com-
munist International (Komintern) created in March i919 at the Congress in Moscow,
dissolved eventually in May 1943.
Originally the Soviet government claimed freedom of the press in order to explain
noncomplicity of the Soviet government in the propaganda emanating from Russia.
In due course, however, responsibility for propaganda emanating from Russia was
disclaimed by the government altogether and was claimed to be organized by
the Komintern, which could not be identified with the government of the Soviet
Union. Thus the note of September 27, 1921, of Maxim Litvinov (deputy People's
Commissar for Foreign Affairs) addressed to Lord Curzon claimed that the Komin-
tern's presence in Russia was due solely to the fact that it was the only country
where the activities of the Communist parties were legal. There was in fact as little
(or as much) connection between the Soviet government and the Komintern as
between the Second International in Brussels and the Belgian government. The fact
that there were members of the Soviet government in the Komintern, the note
claimed, had as much significance for the government of Russia as the presence of
the British and Belgian ministers in the Second InternationalU 7
And yet, complaints against Soviet propaganda, whether originating from sources
directly identifiable with the Soviet government or those which could be traced to
the Komintern, were continuing, and the Soviet government was hard put to im-
press upon other foreign governments its lack of complicity in the activities of the
Komintern or the Profintern (International Union of Trade Unions) . 8 In the final
analysis, the alibi furnished by the Komintern proved inadequate, causing consid-
erable difficulties in Soviet relations with other countries and affecting the flow of
trade and economic cooperation between the free-economy countries and the Soviet
Union.
VII DoKuM ENY VNESHNEI POLITIKI 369-70.
IV id. at 374-80.
8 VII id. at 55, 210-ii, 469.
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One of the most important affairs of this type was the British-Soviet conflict, a very
complex and prolonged affair involving many issues, such as interference with the
British fishing rights in the Arctic, treatment of British subjects in Russia, anti-
British propaganda in Asia, including action by the Soviet diplomatic personnel, and
Komintern propaganda. The first phase of the conflict was liquidated by an exchange
of notes (May 29 and July 4, 1923) in which the Soviet government accepted inter
alia an obligation not only to refrain from propaganda and hostile activities through
the medium of its diplomatic agents, but also not to support financially "or by any
other means persons, agencies, organizations or institutions which have the aim of
spreading dissatisfaction, or supporting rebellion in any part of the British Empire,
including British protectorates ... and to bind all its officials, and official persons, to
an unreserved and unfailing observance of these obligations."39
The next phase began with the so-called Zinoviev letter, a document of spurious
origin, which caused a good deal of concern in Britain and was exploited for anti-
Soviet propaganda. In the ensuing correspondence, while denying the authenticity
of the letter, the Soviet charge d'affaires restated the old Soviet position that the Kom-
intern and its activities could not be controlled by the Soviet government. The Soviet
note of November 28, 1924, repeated the previous position concerning the "total
and organizational independence of the Communist International of the Govern-
ment of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics." "My Government," the Soviet
charge d'affaires in London continued, "has never accepted and is unable to accept
the obligation to refuse asylum to the Communist International or other workers'
organizations, and even more it cannot accept an obligation to exercise influence upon
them." 0
The next phase, which finally led to a breach in diplomatic relations with Britain
and the denunciation of the Trade Agreement of i92i, began with the decision of
the Soviet trade unions to support financially and encourage the British coal strike in
1926. This decision caused the British government to complain officially to the
Soviet government, and, as the Soviet government's reply was deemed unsatisfactory,
on February 23, 1927, the British government lodged a strong protest with a full
documentation against the repeated acts of Soviet intervention by means of propa-
ganda into the internal affairs of Britain. While anti-Soviet feelings mounted in
Britain, a raid on the offices of the Soviet Trading Corporation (Arcos) on May ii,
1927, led to the seizure and discovery of documents which allegedly proved the com-
plicity of the Soviet trade delegation, which was a part of the diplomatic mission in
London, and of the trading corporation in espionage and subversive activities in
Britain. As a result on May 27, 1927, Britain severed diplomatic relations with
Russia.41




1 ARNOLD I. To=EEa, SuRvEy oF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, 1927, at 256-78 (1929).
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Another incident which demonstrated a complicity of the Soviet trade organization
in subversive activities in a foreign country was the 1924 incident which led to the
police search of the premises of the Soviet trade delegation in Berlin and the
offices of the Soviet trading organization. In a sense the Berlin case, although arising
from a different set of facts and circumstances, had common features with the inci-
dent in Britain in 1927. In both cases the police were faced with the fact that the
premises of the trade delegation, which was legally a part of the diplomatic establish-
ment, were shared by the trade organization, a private (in the receiving country)
organization representing commercial interests of the Soviet Union. The two theo-
retically separate organizations were in fact parts of the single agency, which, owing
to its contacts with the social and economic life of the receiving country, could
exercise considerable political influence.
The immediate cause of the Berlin incident was the flight of an arrested suspect
and his escape from the hands of the German police. The suspect pursued by the
police sought refuge in the building of the Soviet trade organization. Members of
the organization as well as of the trade delegation (members of the diplomatic
mission) interfered with the police and prevented the recapture of the suspect. In
retaliation the police raided the premises and brought to light that both the members
of the diplomatic corps and the members of the trade organization were deeply
immersed in the internal politics of Germany.
The real cause of these difficulties in both Britain and Germany was the fact
that members of both the diplomatic mission and the trading organization were
revolutionaries with intimate connections in the underground activities in the coun-
tries in which they were posted, and were still maintaining these connections while in
the employ of the Soviet government. The trade delegation and the trade organiza-
tion in Berlin were closed on May 14, 1924, and the Soviet-German Protocol of
July 29, 1924, which ended the incident, acknowledged that activities of this type were
incompatible with the presence of Soviet citizens in Germany in their capacity
as agents of the Soviet state:
The government of the Soviet Union confirms that it, in accordance with the
agreements in force and on the basis of reciprocity, has prohibited its official per-
sons and government servants . ..to take part in the domestic political life in
Germany.2
A third incident which again compromised a government official (a member
of the Soviet foreign service) was the case of the Soviet Ambassador in France,
Rakovsky, who, while attending in Moscow the sessions of the Central Committee
of the Control Commission of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, had put
his signature to a declaration in which the so-called opposition to the official Party
line (Trotsky, Kamenev, Zinoviev) called "for the defeat of all the bourgeois states
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which carry on the war against the Soviet Union" and declared "that every honest
proletarian in the capitalist countries must work effectively towards the defeat of his
government" and that "all soldiers of foreign countries who do not desire to help
their slavemasters" must desert to the Red Army43
This incident occasioned the French government to protest. Soviet Foreign
Commissar Chicherin issued a statement in which he repudiated the idea that one
of the official representatives of the USSR could organize propaganda inciting
insurrection in the country in which he was accredited, and that this certainly did
not apply to France. However, the damage was done, and in due course Rakovsky
was recalled."
Incidents of this type were causing concern to the Soviet leadership, and on
several occasions the Soviet Foreign Commissar warned Soviet foreign service per-
sonnel to stay out of politics in the receiving countries.45 By 1924, German and
British difficulties had convinced the Soviet leadership that a new approach in inter-
national relations was necessary, and directives for the conduct of Soviet foreign
service personnel were enacted 46 These directives were a reflection of the difficulties
which the Soviet governmental apparatus was facing in the area of international
relations. One of the important achievements of the Soviet policy was, the directives
pointed out, that the Soviet Union was able to establish normal relations with a
number of countries. The directives acknowledged that occasionally, owing to its
specific character, the Soviet state may experience difficulties in its peaceful relations
with the capitalist states, but they emphasized that Soviet missions are sent abroad
for purposes which rule out propaganda in the countries in which they are ac-
credited and that Soviet missions should adhere to this principle.
At the same time, the directives pointed out, Soviet diplomatic missions represent
a state of workers and peasants. It is fitting, the directives suggest, that the conduct
of Soviet diplomats should feature simplicity of form, modesty, and absence of
ostentation. Soviet diplomatic personnel may refrain, without any adverse effect upon
its position, from functions and celebrations which are contrary to the nature of the
Soviet state. Similarly, foreign diplomatic personnel in Russia would be excused
from participation in similar occasions having a revolutionary character.
And yet, the 1924 directives went only half way to meet the objections of the
foreign governments as regards hostile propaganda emanating from the Soviet official
sources, or the Komintern, and this ambivalent position was maintained in spite
l'ToYNnE, op. ct. supra note 41, at 288-92.
" Id. at 382.
'" See Instructions of the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs for the representative plenipotentiary
of the R.S.F.S.R. in Afghanistan (June 3, 192i), in IV DOKUMENTY vNEsHNmI PoLrrIKI 165, and his
telegram to the representative plenipotentiary in Persia (Oct. 5, 1921), VII id. at 394. It appears, how-
ever, that the Commissar's authority even over the foreign service personnel was not always supreme and
that interests of diplomacy were at times at odds with political or revolutionary action.
' Decision of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the US.S.R. of Nov. 21, 1924, VII
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of the protests of foreign governments. In 193o Gorky's letter, broadcasted from
Moscow inciting workers of all states, especially in France and Britain, to oppose their
governments' foreign intervention against Russia, caused the British government to
protest. In 1935 Ambassador Bullitt protested when the Seventh Congress of the
Communist International approved a program of attacks on the economic and
political systems of the United States clearly in contravention of the Litvinoff-Roosevelt
agreement. The Soviet Union resorted to the usual excuse that it did not control
the Komintern and did not assume obligations to silence its propaganda.4 7
IV
PROPAGANDA AT THE CONFERENCE TABLE
The first full demonstration of the Soviet technique of propaganda paralleling
negotiations at the conference table was provided by the Brest-Litovsk Peace Con-
ference with the Central Powers. Already during the short negotiations for the
armistice agreement the Russian delegation insisted on discussing basic issues of
peace and war and on the right to publish freely materials and documents relating
to the course of the negotiations. The immediate goal of the massive propaganda
campaign attending the Brest-Litovsk Conference, which began on December 9
(22), 1917, was to broaden it into a general peace conference. If that had happened,
the political significance of the Russian military defeat would have been reduced to
insignificance. Peace propaganda was also designed to weaken the will to fight in
the enemy camp and to cause the outbreak of the socialist revolution in Germany.
The Soviet government's appeal addressed to the toilers of Germany asked them to
support peace negotiations and peace aims of the revolutionary government. Mili-
tarist circles in Germany would be denied the fruits of victory in Russia, and a new
world order would be established. "However," the declaration warned, "we shall
achieve such peace when all countries shall dictate peace conditions by means of a revo-
lution, and when not only Russia but all other nations shall send to the peace con-
ference delegations representing the popular masses and not those representing the
capitalist and militarist circles."4"
The next opportunity to confront the world with the Soviet concept of interna-
tional relations was the Economic Conference of Genoa (i922), convened in order
to re-establish trade and economic cooperation in Europe, including Russia. The
Soviets' chief concern was to solicit trade and economic assistance. And yet, the
Soviet chief delegate, Chicherin, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, considered
it essential to open this new phase in Soviet foreign policy with discussion of a matter
which was not on the agenda of the Economic Conference. On April IO, 1922, he
treated the plenary session of the Conference to a long exposition of the Leninist
' JOHN B. ,VMITTON & ARTHUR LARso, PROPAGANDA: TOWARDS DSARMAMENT IN THE VAR OF NWORDS
28 (1964).
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principles of peaceful coexistence between Russia's socialist government and the
capitalists surrounding. In addition he submitted a proposal for a general limitation
of armaments and reduction of armed forces of all countries. Finally, he proposed
convening a world peace conference.4 9
The Genoa Conference, which had been a failure in terms of its official purpose,
was deemed a success in terms of the Soviet diplomatic game. It was followed by
a regional disarmament conference which met in December 1922 in Moscow, in-
cluding Poland, Finland, Latvia, and Estonia in addition to the host country.
The conference produced no results, owing to Soviet resistance to making disarma-
ment a part of an over-all plan for nonaggression guarantees and peaceful settlement
procedures, which were, in the minds of the other participants, a sine qua non of the
disarmament proposals.5 °
The same line was followed during the Lausanne Conference, which met almost
simultaneously concerning the regime of the Turkish straits. The Soviet delegation
to the conference assumed the mantle of the defender of peace, general disarmament,
and the rights of small and weaker nations. 1
The opportunity for propaganda at the conference table in a grand style came
during the Disarmament Conference, which, during a crucial period of the interwar
era, occupied the center of the international arena. In the eyes of public opinion,
the Soviet contribution to the work of the conference was linked with the person of
Maxim Litvinoff and marked a new era in the evolution in Soviet foreign policy,
which culminated in the Soviet Union's joining the League of Nations, from which
it was later to be expelled for its attack on Finland. The Soviet Union's participa-
tion in the work of the disarmament conference indicated that its position had
changed from that of a revisionist power to that of a defender of the status quo.
It had modified its attitude of hostility toward the League of Nations, although
preserving some of its basic reservations as to the usefulness of this international
organization. In an interview with a New York Times correspondent on Decem-
ber 25, 1933, Stalin averred that the Soviet attitude to the League of Nations was
not fundamentally hostile and that he could see its usefulness in the preservation of
peace. He admitted that "the League may act in some measure like a brake, retard-
ing or preventing an armed conflict.""
Even more important, the Soviet Union, which in the beginning focused its
attention on the problem of total disarmament or at least reduction of armaments,
disregarding-in line with the 1922 Moscow Conference-all other aspects of interna-
' MATERIALY GENuEZKOI KONFERENTSII [MATERIAL OF THE GENOA CONFERENCE] 89-92 (1922);
GEORGIa V. CRICHERIN, STATII I RECHI PO VOPROSANM EZIDUNARODNOI POLITIKI [ARATICLES AND ADDRESSES
ON PROBLEMS OF FOREIGN POLICY] 208-i2 (1962).
°VI DoxumENrTY VNESHNEI POLITIKI 39 (x962).
5 1 See the Declaration of the Russian delegation at the first session of the Straits Commission of the
Conference of Lausanne, id. at 35-38.
"IN.Y. Times, Dec. 28, 1933, p. , col. ; 13 STALIN, SOCINENrA [Woxs] 280 (1951).
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tional security (prevention of aggression and peaceful settlement of international dis-
putes), came out with the most radical statement regarding the definition of
aggression. It included in its concept of aggression propaganda that would be in-
compatible with the right of each nation to "free development according to its own
choice and at the rate that suits it best" and with the right to safeguard "the security,
independence, and complete territorial inviolability of each state and its right of self-
defense against attack or invasion from the outside."53
Soviet participation in the Disarmament Conference opened with the proposal
submitted in 1927 to the Preparatory Commission for a complete and total dis-
armament. It called for disbandment of all armed land, air, and naval forces;
destruction of arms, warships, military airships, fortresses, and armament factories;
abolition of military service; suppression of military budgets; suppression of military
and naval administrations. Military propaganda and instruction were also to be
prohibited.5 4 A year later, while the original proposals were still being discussed,
the Soviet delegation put before the assembled diplomats another version of the
disarmament proposals.55
While pushing for the adoption of drastic disarmament measures, the Soviet
Union voiced its fundamental opposition to other aspects of the collective security
system-prohibition of aggression and peaceful settlement of international disputes-
doubting whether the Soviet state could trust the impartiality of international tri-
bunals or international organizations. Still, Litvinoff, speaking at the Disarmament
Conference in 1933, had this to say:
We represent the only country in the whole world which has altered its political
system and created a perfectly new political system.... You are aware that the
phenomenon of a Soviet socialist state was so distasteful to the whole capitalist world
that, at the time, attempts were even made by way of intervention to restore cap-
italism in our country, or at least by way of dismemberment to reduce the dimension
of the new state.56
Litvinoff was further of the opinion that anti-Soviet policy still represented the core
of the foreign policy of the capitalist countries and that plans were currently being
made to destroy the Soviet system. In consequence, he thought:
... it is permissible to enquire whether the Soviet Union may expect a fair attitude
towards it and impartial decisions from any international organ, when such an
organ consists exclusively of the representatives of a capitalist world which is hostile
to it .... It seems to me that there can be no two answers to this question, and
should anyone here doubt this, I would recommend him to imagine, for the sake of
hypothesis, that his own state is the only capitalistic country in the midst of countries
" CONFERENCE FOR THE REDUCTION AND LIMITATION Op ARMAMENTS, MINUTrES op THE GENERAL
COMM'N, 14 DEc. 1932 TO 29 JUNE 1933, at 237 (League of Nations Pub. No. 1933.IX.Io).
"LPREPARATORY Comm'N FOR THE DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE, MINUTES 30 NOV. TO 3 DEc. X927, at
io (League of Nations Pub. No. 19 28.IX.2).
s Ibid.
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which have established the Soviet system and are building socialism, and I would
ask him to tell us if he thinks his country would entrust the solution of a question
vital to itself to an international organ consisting exclusively of representatives of the
governments of Soviet countries.57
V
THE END OF THE MYTH: EXIT KomiNTERN
The Second World War initiated a basic revision of Soviet attitudes, coloring
their foreign policy and reflecting upon the Soviet concept of the world public order.
It took some time before the Soviet leadership, still consisting of men who made
the October 1917 revolution, adapted Soviet policies to new conditions in the interna-
tional situation. The Soviet Union was no longer the only socialist state, whose great
power status was potential rather than real and which was neither able to, nor did,
aspire to the role of the leader in a community of nations consisting exclusively
of capitalist countries. Instead, the Soviet Union was one of the few great powers
which emerged from the war, having borne the brunt of the war in Europe. Its
dominant position in Asia and eastern Europe extended its influence over its smaller
neighbors, laying foundations for the future commonwealth of socialist nations, a
political system which in international relations follows the Soviet lead and speaks
with one voice.
Soviet great-power status was won not in the course of a world revolution, but
by the victory in the war in alliance with the great western democracies. The new
status was expressed in two forms. First, the Soviet Union, together with four
other great powers, assumed responsibility for the liquidation of the aftereffects
of the war. Second, the Soviet Union became one of the permanent members of the
United Nations Security Council, which according to the original design was to be
the center of political decisions on the issues of war and peace. For the first time
in its history, the Soviet Union was no longer isolated and was able to guard its
interests effectively against the entire capitalist world.
The process of adjustment from the position of virtual isolation to great-power
status, including a seat in the great-power directorate of the world, began with the dis-
mantling of the Komintern. This fact more than anything else indicated that the
Soviet approach to problems of foreign policy was no longer a matter of ideology but
a matter of great-power position. Stalin, commenting on the meaning of the dissolu-
tion of the Komintern in May 1943, explained that the dissolution exploded the
Hiderite propaganda that "Moscow" intends to interfere in the internal affairs
of other countries and to Bolshevize them and that Communist parties in other coun-
tries are subject to orders from abroad. The dissolution of the Komintern, he further
pointed out, made it possible for the members of the Communist parties to cooperate
with other progressive and patriotic movements of their countries for the struggle
57 Ibid.
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against Fascism and for national liberation. Finally, the dissolution of the Komin-
tern, in the words of Stalin,
made possible the work of the patriots of all countries for the unification of all
peace-loving nations into a single international camp for the struggle with the threat
of world domination of Hitlerism, clearing the way for the organization in the
future of the international commonwealth of nations on the basis of their equality. s
Since the dissolution of the Komintern, the Soviet Union has never again resorted to
the services of a theoretically independent propaganda agency of this type. The
Cominform, created in 1947 and dissolved in 1955, had no connections with foreign
Communist parties and played no role in propaganda actions outside the Soviet
bloc.
The second revision of the basic Soviet tenets about the technique of international
relations in a world consisting of socialist and capitalist states concerned the doc-
trine of the inevitability of wars. Early in the postwar period, Stalin was rather
pessimistic regarding the chances of permanent peace in the community of nations
as it then existed. In his electoral speech of February 9, 1946, he maintained that
The Second World War demonstrated positively the possibility of peaceful collabora-
tion between world powers, even in the following period. However, the Yalta and
Potsdam agreements were violated by the other powers, and foreign policy of the
capitalist states remained fundamentally unchanged. Consequently, as capitalist
countries constitute the majority, it is impossible to achieve peaceful change in inter-
national relations. Wars shall still be the main method of adjusting the control
of the world markets and sources of raw materials, bringing about a shift in the
balance of power.59
At the same time, even during Stalin's reign it was claimed that, on the whole,
the security of the Soviet Union is practically assured, owing to its strength and the
growth of the progressive tendencies in the worldV0 After the death of Stalin, in
connection with the dissolution of the Cominform in 1955, Pravda wrote that the
Cominform was established because the
reactionary circles of the Western Powers broke their wartime policy of cooperation
with the USSR and declared the cold war .... As a result, the danger of a new
war became acute .... However, in recent years there have been changes in the
international situation. The extension of socialism beyond the boundaries of a
single country and its transformation into a world system; the formation of a vast
"peace zone" including both the socialist and nonsocialist peace-loving countries of
Europe and Asia; the growth and consolidation of many Communist parties in
capitalist, dependent countries; ... reduced the danger of war.0 1
" I VNESHNAIA POLITIKA SOVETSKOGO SOIUZA V PERIOD OTECHESTVENNOI VOINY [FOREIGN POLICY OF THE
SOVIET UNION IN THE PERIOD OF THE PATRIOTIC WAR] 104-05 (946).
5' VNESHNAIA POLITIKA SOVEsTSKOCO SOIUZA, 1946 [FOREIGN POLICY OF THE SOVIET UNION] 28 (1952).
o See, for instance, the Declaration of the Nine Parties of September 1947, Pravda, Nov. io, 1947.
"'Pravda, April x8, 1955; Izvestia, April 18, 1955.
PROPAGANDA AND THE SOVIET UNION
The communique on the dissolution of the Cominform stated as follows:
For the first time in history there has arisen the possibility of preventing new
wars and imperialist aggression through the united effort of the peace-loving
nations and peoples. . . . New prospects have also opened up for the transition
of various countries to socialism including the possibility of using parliaments for
transforming the capitalist societies of certain nations into socialist ones.
62
In other words, the world situation and the balance of power seemed to rule out
important changes in the political ideological morphology of the world by means of
great wars, and in this sense the Soviet Union assumed the policy of defense of the
status quo. Changes, if any, will come through the transition of the colonial peoples
to independent statehood, through the economic expansion of the socialist nations,
and through a long-range shift in the balance of power from the old industrial
societies, the traditional members of the international community, to new centers of
power, civilization, and culture, which will hopefully align themselves with the
socialist system.
This shifting of ideological positions was significantly aided by the three suc-
cessive failures of schemes designed to effect forcefully a change in the balance of
power. Attempts to isolate and push the Western Powers out of Berlin, the Korean
War, and the missile crisis in Cuba have demonstrated that this type of action must
end in failure and that the balance of forces is too stable to reward international ad-
venturism of any kind.
VI
PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE AND WARS OF NATIONAL LIBERATION
In the situation where major conflagration and the use of force between the two
pretenders to world leadership is excluded, the Soviet leadership responded with two
doctrines which conform to the conditions of international life at the present: "peace-
ful coexistence" and "wars of national liberation."
The Soviet theory of international relations is based upon the Clausewitzian model
of politics: Peace is the pursuit of policy by nonmilitary means. Stalin, characterizing
the international position of the Soviet state after the period of foreign intervention,
stated that "the period of the open war was replaced by a period of peaceful
struggle."'  Indeed, coexistence is also struggle, and, as Chicherin pointed out
in his note to the German government in September of 1918, the Soviet regime's
raison d'etre is bound up with anticapitalist propaganda. 4
In terms of the present study, which aims to analyze Soviet propaganda as an
international relations technique within the framework of world public order of the
present time, the basic Soviet thesis is that anticapitalist (or anti-imperialist) propa-
"Ibid. The Soviet position was also dictated by the nuclear stalemate. See Khrushchev's speech
reported in Pravda, Izvestia, Jan. i, I96o.
"5 STALIN, op. cit. supra note 52, at 117 (1947).
"See text accompanying note 34 supra.
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
ganda is permissible under international law and is fully compatible with interna-
tional cooperation. Indeed, it is the very essence of the rule of law. The i95i edition
of International Law (Mezhdunarodnoe pravo), a work sponsored by the Soviet
Academy of Science, stated that:
Norms of international law and its institutions serve in the hands of the truly
democratic countries and governments as a weapon for the strengthening of demo-
cratic principles of legality in international relations, and in the hands of the anti-
democratic and reactionary governments to deceive the peoples, as a means of
camouflaging their imperialistic plans of expansion and aggression.... Economics
and policy, philosophy and law represent at the present time an area of struggle
of the two camps.... International law also represents such an area.65
Since the doctrine of the inevitability of war was declared no longer valid, propa-
ganda, the vehicle of the ideological (peaceful) struggle, became the chief tech-
nique of the peaceful struggle between the two worlds of socialism and capitalism.
Khrushchev made ideological struggle an indispensable condition of peaceful rela-
tions of socialist countries with capitalist nations:
Messrs. capitalists accuse us of simultaneously proclaiming the policy of peaceful
coexistence and talking about the struggle between the communist and bourgeois
ideologies. Yes, this struggle goes on because it expresses the interests of different
classes. This is fully legitimate. Capitalists . . . defend by all means the private
ownership of the means of production. . . . We communists . . . are opposed to
private ownership of the means of production .... But the capitalist and socialist
countries are situated on the same planet; they cannot depart anywhere from this
planet. This means we must coexist. . .. Our ideas will conquer mankind.60
As an important Soviet theoretician put it:
Peaceful coexistence is not a conflictless life. As long as different social-political
systems continue to exist, the antagonisms between them are unavoidable. Peaceful
coexistence is a struggle-political, economic, and ideological. . . . Coexistence
means that one does not fight the other, does not attempt to solve international
disputes by arms, but that one competes through peaceful work and cultural
activities. But we would cease to be Marxist-Leninists if we forgot the elementary
laws of social life, the laws of class struggle.67
Thus, peaceful coexistence and ideological struggle represent, in the Soviet view,
inherent and inseparable elements of international relations between socialist and cap.
italist countries. In the letter to the Revue G&nirale de Droit International Public
(Paris), eight Soviet professors of international law, including the late Eugene
Korovin, stated that
The programme of the Communist Party attributes a big place to the definition
of Peaceful Coexistence and of its different aspects as one of the forms of the class
" MEMZDUNARODNOE PRAVO [INTERNATIoNAL LAW] 3-4 (1951).
" Pravda, April z6, 1957.
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struggle in the international arena,-political, economic, and cultural struggle-
which accomplishes itself with exclusively peaceful methods.68
And finally, the new program of the Communist Party of i961 defined peaceful
coexistence as a "peaceful competition between socialism and capitalism on an inter-
national scale" and as a "specific form of class struggle."
VII
PROPAGANDA WITHIN LIMITS OF LAW
When Chicherin wrote his note on the anti-German propaganda in September
1918, he claimed that the Soviet government would betray its nature if it desisted from
that form of struggle: it may be contrary to international law, or normal rules of
diplomacy, but is justified by the law of life. Now, with the doctrine of peaceful
coexistence, which the Soviet government claims constitutes the basic principle of
international law-in the same manner as for instance the principle pacta sunt
servanda-ideological struggle and propaganda are legally permitted, and no cap-
italist state has a claim to demand that a socialist government desist from that
propaganda which conforms to the rules of peaceful coexistence. This, however,
raises another question concerning what propaganda is permissible propaganda.
The answer is that propaganda is permissible when it furthers the aims of the prin-
ciple of peaceful coexistence. By another definition, propaganda of the Soviet foreign
policy, a policy of peace, is permissible.
It is claimed that peace has always been the cardinal objective of Soviet policies
since the inception of the Soviet regime. Revolution in Russia was linked to the
slogan of the struggle for peace. The Soviet government's struggle for its recog-
nition, for the recognition of the social and economic order of the Soviet policy,
and for economic assistance, was linked with the quest for peace. While the direct
motivation of this line of policy and propaganda was that peace was needed in order
to build socialism and, at present, communism in the Soviet Union, it is also main-
tained that war, as a means of policy, is incompatible with socialism. The official
doctrine is that once human societies of the world shall adopt the socialist form
of economy and the Soviet form of government, wars shall disappear from interna-
tional relations and the era of permanent peace shall come. Even now, owing to
the influence of the Soviet Union and of the socialist camp, contemporary interna-
tional law has adopted a good deal of the future world order. With little concern
"'Reprinted in EDWARD MCWHINNEY, "PFACEFUL COEXISTENCE" AND SOVIET-WESTERN INTERNATIONAL
LAw 128 (x964). For a general treatment of the doctrine of peaceful coexistence see WLADYSLAW W.
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THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 25-30 (1964); Lapenna, The Legal Aspects and Political Significance of
the Soviet Concept of Co-existence, 12 INT'L & Comp. L.Q. (4 th ser.) 737 (1963). For the Soviet point
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Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo, no. 7, x963, p. 26, 26-27.
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for historical accuracy, the English version of the USSR Academy of Science treatise
on international law asserts:
Thanks to the consistent struggle of the democratic forces, above all the socialist
countries, the generally recognised principles of International Law have been
affirmed in a number of international legal documents. In its Preamble the U.N.
Charter, for example, states that member countries undertake "to practise tolerance
and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours," and to unite their
"strength to maintain international peace and security."69
Soviet scholars point out that the Soviet struggle for peace has initiated mass move-
ments for peace in western Europe, leading to peace congresses in Paris, Prague,
and StockholmY°
Total support of peace must be understood dialectically, i.e., not excluding
the use of arms and force in promoting the spread of socialism, emancipation of
colonial peoples, and liquidation of empires. Propaganda of peace is thus compatible
with support for "wars of national liberation."
Soviet support for insurgency in colonial empires had little justification in the
actual content of rules of international law. From the beginning the Soviet regime
acknowledged its adherence to the doctrine of national self-determination. In this
sense the principle of self-determination was considered identical with the right to
national independence, which in Soviet policy was equated with membership in the
Soviet Union, whatever the form Soviet constitutionalism assigned to the member
nationality or people: union republic, autonomous republic, autonomous province,
or national district. Thus, while theoretically radical, the Soviet doctrine of self-
determination was far from revolutionary.
Since the Charter of the United Nations was adopted, the principle of self-
determination was declared to be a fundamental policy for the international com-
munity. However, this provision of the Charter has hardly made a change in the
fundamental rules of international law, as the Charter has not made every people or
nationality, whether colonial or not, eligible to be a member of the United Nations,
its membership being open to states only.
On December x4, 1960, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the resolu-
tion on "Granting Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples." This resolution
had its origin in the speech of Khrushchev who, on September 23, i96o, proposed a
"complete and final liberation of peoples languishing in colonial bondage."71 After
some discussion, a modified version of the Soviet proposal was adopted, which pro-
vided that:
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Immediate steps shall be taken, in Trust and non-self-governing Territories or all
other territories which have not yet attained independence, to transfer all powers to
the peoples of those territories, without any conditions or reservations, in accordance
with their freely expressed will and desires, without any distinction as to race, creed
or colour, in order to enable them to enjoy complete independence and freedom.7 2
Quite apart from the legal significance of the declaration, which has restated in solemn
terms the policy which, as regards its main objective, has been practiced for quite
some time and certainly at a greatly accelerated pace since World War II, it seems
rather dubious whether it may be interpreted to legalize Soviet propaganda of in-
surgency. The declaration clearly prohibited the use of propaganda for subversion
by stating further:
All States shall observe faithfully and strictly the provisions of the Charter
of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the pres-
ent Declaration on the basis of equality, non-interference in the internal affairs
of all States, and respect for the sovereign rights of all peoples and their territorial
integrity1 3
This is not the position of the Soviet government or of the Soviet scholars. Their
thesis is that support for the wars of national liberation is action in the name of the
international community, as the right of each national group to an independent state
is expressly recognized by modern international law, including the Charter of the
United Nations. A state supporting a liberation movement acts in the name of the
international community and in accordance with the rules of international law. As
one of the Soviet international law experts put it,
Wars of national liberation can be equated with one of the forms of interna-
tional sanctions, the application of which on the basis of the United Nations Or-
ganization Charter is being demanded ever more insistently by the peoples towards
colonial powers persisting in their illegal policy of barring self-determination of
dependent peoples 74
VIII
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND SUPPRESSION OF FASCIST WARMONGERING
On December 14, 1946, the General Assembly of the United Nations resolved to
authorize the holding of a conference of all members on freedom of information
and instructed the Economic and Social Council ("EcoSoc") to undertake the con-
vocation of such a conference. The purpose of the conference was "to formulate...
views concerning the rights, obligations and practices which should be included in
the concept of freedom of information. 7 The matter was dealt with subsequently
by EcoSoc, and the date of the conference was set 1
72 Ibid.
7a Ibid.
"' Tuzmukhamedov, Mirnoe sosushchestiovanie i natsionalno-osvoboditielnaa vona [Peaceful Co-
existence and the War of National Liberation], Sovetsko gosudarstvo i pravo, no. 3, 1963, p. 87, 91.
15 1947-48 U.N. YEaRaooK 102 (U.N. Pub. Sales No. X949.13).
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While the General Assembly and then EcoSoc were dealing with this issue,
Soviet actions in eastern Europe were causing a good deal of anxiety in the,West,
with the result that on one hand Soviet motives and foreign policy aims were being
questioned, while on the other serious doubts were felt as to the future of the United
Nations, whose effectiveness in foreign affairs depended upon the concerted action of
the great powers. The world press was further upset by the fact that the Soviet
Union, never a partisan of free information, subjected foreign correspondents to re-
strictions and controls which were highly reminiscent of the press regimes in totali-
tarian countries. In this situation, discussion of the need for free exchange of in-
formation in order to safeguard peace by the control of public opinion was contrary
to basic Soviet policies. At the same time, the rising tide of alarm in the world over
Soviet actions in eastern Europe and in divided Germany called for some kind of
Soviet counteraction, in order to reduce the impact of these developments upon the
public mind of the free communities.
The Soviet position in principle was expressed in the draft resolution submitted
by the Soviet delegate to the Third Committee of the United Nations on August 3,
1947. The draft resolution asked that the agenda of the conference be reconsidered
with the purpose of defining the freedom of the press with a view to eradication of
Fascist ideologies and exposure of warmongers. Furthermore, freedom of informa-
tion would be assured only if the broad masses had at their disposal the material
resources to establish press organs, to prevent the bribery of privately owned press
organs, and to establish proper measures to institute censorship of privately owned
press organsY7
The Soviet proposals would have provided full freedom for the Soviet press and
subjected the press in the free-economy countries to censorship and other control
measures. In the discussion of the draft of the resolution, the Soviet delegate declared
that in the free-economy countries freedom of the press means the freedom of the
reactionary Fascist circles to impose their views on the majority of the people, as
only these circles control the means to publish papers and magazines. In the free-
economy countries the press represents the views of its owners. The world, the Soviet
delegate continued, was interested in the information favoring international
cooperation, and therefore only social ownership of the means of information would
assure the right kind of information. As this is not possible in the free-economy
countries, strict control of the press and criminal liability for distortion of informa-
tion and warmongering ought to be established there. The future conference ought
to determine the propaganda content and deny it to the Fascist circlesY8 While un-
able to accept the Soviet point of view, which would in effect rule out the freedom
of the press and unhindered flow of information, the General Assembly adopted
Ibid.
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on November 8, 1947, a resolution which on one hand confirmed the duty of all
members of the United Nations to uphold fundamental freedoms, including the
freedom of expression, and at the same time condemned "all forms of propaganda
in whatsoever country conducted, which is either designed or likely to provoke or
encourage any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression."79
In connection with the discussion in the General Assembly of the Draft of the
Convention on the Freedom of Information, the Soviet delegate charged that the
draft was totally unsatisfactory and that the Soviet Union would vote against it. The
draft prescribed only how the press and other media should be used to provide
efficient service for the owners of newspapers and the large publishing houses, but
the question of combating the slanderous information about several states including
the Soviet Union was never raised. Soviet delegate Gromyko further charged that
the Western Powers daily spread false information about the peoples' democracies.
Newspaper monopolies were seeking entry into other countries in order to spread
slanderous information, to whip up war hysteria, and to arouse hatred. Newspaper
correspondents were being employed to gather defense information and information
on industry, agriculture, and science. The Soviet Union, Gromyko continued, resorts
to censorship to combat the slander of Russia by foreign correspondents. Soviet
censorship is not directed against freedom of information but aims to prevent the
spreading of distorted information."0
On various occasions the Soviet government has charged governments of other
countries with hostile propaganda and warmongering. On September 8, 1947, the
Soviet representative in the United Nations General Assembly charged the United
States government with fomenting war psychosis and propaganda favoring a new war
against the Soviet Union. All means of propaganda were used in order to justify an
arms race and increased production of atomic weapons. Behind all these activities,
the Soviet delegate asserted, were influencial circles in America (American monopo-
lies) seeking realization of their expansionist plans. As the Soviet representative
explained, large press organs, owned or controlled by American capitalists, were
waging war propaganda. Also, various scientific institutions and universities in the
United States were guilty of spreading such propaganda. The Soviet delegate asked
that a resolution be passed condemning propaganda in a number of countries, in-
cluding the United States, Britain, Turkey, and Greece, and recommending that
such propaganda be prohibited by means of internal legislation, proper censorship,
and disarmament.81
On several occasions the Soviet Union has alleged that certain publications which
appeared in various countries violated the November 1947 resolution of the General
Assembly. A Soviet note addressed to the United States government charged that an
79 1947-48 U.N. Y.ARBjooKt 88-93 (U.N. Pub. Sales No. 1949.I.3).
"' Pravda, Izvestia, May 18, 1949.
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article appearing in the May 17, 1948, issue of Newsweek, discussing the role of the
American military bases abroad, was contrary to the resolution concerning warmonger-
ing, and lodged a formal protest with the United States government.82 A similar pro-
test was lodged with the government of Holland on the same date.
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In 1951 the Soviet Union passed the Peace Defense Act of March 12, i95I, which
declared that, "guided by the lofty principles of Soviet policy of peace," recognizing
"that the conscience and the sense of justice of the peoples, who in the lifetime of one
generation have gone through the calamities of two world wars, cannot tolerate the
impunity with which war propaganda is being conducted by aggressive circles of
certain states," and joining hands "with the appeal of the Second World Peace Con-
gress, which expressed the will of the whole of progressive mankind to prohibit and
condemn criminal war propaganda," the Supreme Soviet of the USSR resolved to
adopt the following law: "i. That war propaganda, in whatever form conducted,
undermines the cause of peace, creates the danger of a new war, and is therefore a
grave crime against humanity; 2. That persons guilty of war propaganda shall be
committed for trial as major criminals."84
As a criminal law provision, the Peace Defense Act leaves a number of questions
unanswered. Does it provide punishment for crimes against peace committed on
Soviet territory only, or also for those committed abroad? What constitutes an act
of propaganda? Does it provide punishment for Soviet citizens only, or also aliens?
Does it punish only warmongering against the Soviet Union, or also against third
states ?
On the international forum the question of the legality of Soviet propaganda is
an open issue. At the present moment the Soviet Union has declared itself against
the old and established practice that prohibits hostile propaganda against other coun-
tries with which it maintains normal diplomatic relations. The issue of propaganda
belongs to that great mass of law and policy which divides the free world from
the socialist countries. There is little doubt that freedom of the press and the free
flow of information across national frontiers represents an important technique for
the relaxation of tensions and for the buildup of trust and confidence between nations.
This freedom would have to be exercised in the name of general weal irrespective
of the national interests of individual countries. It is possible to achieve this aim with
the press privately owned in the free societies and with social ownership in the socialist
countries. Neither free societies nor the socialist countries are prepared to acknowl-
edge the hazards to peace inherent in both systems of press and publishing ownership.
And yet, in more recent times an attempt has been made to cross the battle lines
drawn in the ideological conflict in the propaganda area.
In the spring of 1962 when the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference con-
" Izvestia, June zo, r948.
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vened in Geneva, the Soviet delegation insisted that the work of the conference must
begin with a ban on war propaganda. For the first time since the issue of the freedom
of the press was raised, a possibility of a compromise was present, and on May 25,
x962, the conference adopted a resolution which provided that measures of censorship
to prevent war propaganda were necessary. The resolution recommended that states
"adopt, within the limits of their political systems, appropriate practical measures, in-
cluding measures in a legislative form, in the case of states which consider such form
appropriate, with a view to giving effect to this declaration against war propaganda."
Both the United States and the Soviet Union voted with all other delegations to
adopt the resolution. However, a few days later the Soviet delegate was instructed
to withdraw the Soviet acceptance."s
In the perspective of close to half a century of coexistence with the free-economy
countries, Soviet policy is marked by an increasing recognition of the importance of
the rule of law within the international community. However, the Soviet govern-
ment seems to be convinced that its role in history is such that some form of struggle
and competition within that international community cannot be avoided and that
propaganda is one of the legitimate instruments of its struggle to achieve political
aims. While apparently believing that propaganda's use is within the sovereign
discretion of each state, Soviet policy tends more and more to recognize that the
scope and form of propaganda are subject to restrictions resulting from international
law. How stable is this tendency? Will the Soviet government adhere to legal
restrictions, even as it has come to view them, in all circumstances in the future? Is
it reasonable to hope for an increasing consensus on the legitimacy of subversive
propaganda? These are questions which lie well beyond the scope of a legal and
historical inquiry.
11N.Y. Times, May 26, 1962, p. x, col. i; WHrrToN & LARsoN, op. cit. supra note 47.
